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NO-WIN SITUATION: THE PLIGHT OF 
THE HMONG-AMERICA'S FORMER ALLY 
Brian W. Jacobs* 
Last month, Hmong leaders of a refugee camp in Thailand sent 
a 5,OOO-signature petition to Congress, pleading for American help to 
stop their imminent forced repatriation to Laos. Soon after the petition 
arrived in Washington, the Thai government arrested six of the peti-
tioners, saying they would be jailed until they agreed to "voluntarily" 
return to Laos. I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Hmong2 are a people who feel that they have been placed in 
a no-win predicament, so any efforts that they make should be directed 
towards gaining at least a measure of safety for themselves and their 
people. The Hmong state that they are being forced from refugee 
camps in Thailand to Laos, where they fear for their lives because of 
past hostilities against the ruling government. 3 The Hmong were a 
pre-literate4 hill tribe living in the mountainous region of Burma, 
China, Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos5 when they were called upon by 
the United States to resist the aggression of the Indochinese commu-
nists who were threatening the political order in the area.6 With the 
defeat of the United States, many thousands of the Hmong fled to 
Thailand, where they live in refugee camps.7 Presently, at a critical time 
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 Marc Kaufman, U.S. Lawmakers Turn Up the Heat for Hmong Fighting Repatriation, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Oct. 3, 1994, at A2. 
2 The Hmong in the past have been referred to as the "Mea," which is a pejorative term 
implying slavery and contempt.JANE HAMILTON-MERRITT, TRAGIC MOUNTAINS: THE HMONG, THE 
AMERICANS, AND THE SECRET WARS FOR LAOS, 1942-1992, at 3 (1993). The Americans who fought 
in this area used the term "Mea." Id. at 206-07. 
3 Marc Kaufman, Hmong Activists Decry What They Say Is Forced Repatriation to Laos, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Apr. 27, 1994, at A7. 
4 Stephen Magagnini, Hmong General Carries on Fight for His PeoplR in U.S., SACRAMENTO 
BEE,July 2,1995, at AI, availablR in WESTLAW, NPMJ File. 
5 See TIMOTHY N. CASTLE, AT WAR IN THE SHADOW OF VIETNAM 5 (1993). 
6Id. at 38. 
7 Kaufman, supra note 3, at A7. 
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in their history, they have been forgotten or ignored by the interna-
tional community, particularly by the people of the United States, 
whose government relied on their help during the Vietnam War.s The 
Hmong allege that their people are being forced to repatriate to Laos, 
which still maintains the same government which they resisted for the 
United States.9 This forced repatriation is being conducted with the 
consent of the world communitylO and funding from the United States 
governmentY Some United States officials see the Hmong refugee 
issue as an obstacle to foreign economic development and political 
opportunity.12 
This Note examines the current plight of the Hmong and advo-
cates that the Hmong should focus their energies on achieving the 
attention of the world community, which may, at the very least, help 
to insure their future safety. Part II of the Note presents a historical 
background to their current plight. Part III examines possible legal 
claims of the Hmong. Finally, Part IV examines other possible solutions 
to the problems the Hmong face. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Hmong People 
In order to understand the situation that the Hmong now face, it 
is important to understand the Hmong people and the events that led 
to the current repatriation of the Hmong to Laos. In the mid- Twen-
tieth Century, the Hmong lived in the mountain regions of Southeast 
Asial3, especially in Laos, and they maintained their existence through 
the use of slash and burn agriculture.l4 Rice was their key subsistence 
crop, but their most important crop was opium.15 The Hmong use 
opium as a traditional source of medicinel6, and have used opium as 
8 See generally CASTLE, supra note 5, at 79-83. 
9 See Hmong Refugees Fear Forced Repatriation, BANGKOK POST, Dec. 4, 1994, available in 
WESTlAW, INT-NEWS File. 
10 See Kaufman, supra note I, at A2. 
II See Marc Kaufman, Those Other Refugees-Why America Owes a Special Debt to the Forgotten 
Hmong, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1994, at C5. 
12 Marc Kaufman, Allies Abandoned-The United States Enlisted the Hmong to Help Fight the Cold 
War. Now it is Shunning Then During the Peace. PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 27, 1994, in FEATURES 
INQUIRER MAGAZINE, available in WESTIAW, PHILINQ File. 
13 CASTLE, supra note 5, at 5. 
14 Id. at 6. 
15Id. 
16Kaufman, supra note 12. 
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a cash crop, selling it to the Chinese, Vietnamese, and colonial French, 
who profited from the drug tradeY 
The Hmong were generally able to stay independent of the con-
trolling governments of the Lao region. 18 This government was a mon-
archy at the time of the Vietnam War.19 In 1950, a new resistance group 
called the Pathet Lao formed to oppose the current monarchy of 
Laos.20 This political faction began to align itself with the Viet Minh, 
the communists ofVietnam.21 The United States gradually entered the 
Vietnam War in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
B. The Hmong in the "Secret War" 
The communist forces began to threaten the monarchy, and the 
United States viewed the Laotian monarchy as a key barrier to the 
aggressive acts of the communists in the region.22 Even though the 
United States was unwilling to directly intervene militarily in Laos,23 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) looked for allies to protect the 
area. 24 The Pathet Lao had been encroaching on the Plain of Jars, a 
traditional land of the Hmong.25 The CIA found General Vang Pao, 
the military leader of the Hmong.26 
The Hmong had been fighting the Pathet Lao under the direction 
of Vang Pao for some time before the arrival of the CIA, to oppose 
encroachment on their territoriallands.27 The forces ofVang Pao were 
not part of the royal army, but rather were a separate, independent 
fighting force. 28 A special contingent of CIA officers, John E. 'Jack" 
Shirley, Lloyd "Pat" Landry, and Anthony "Tony" Poe, were instructed 
by Gordon L. Jorgenson, the CIA station chief at the United States 
Embassy, to begin the recruitment and military training of the Hmong 
population.29 The Hmong said that they would be willing to fight the 
Pathet Lao if they had the weaponry.30 These CIA officials made prom-
17 [d. 
18 CASTLE, supra note 5, at 6. 
19 [d. at 4. 
20 [d. at 5. 
21 [d. 
22 [d. at 26-27. 
23 See id. at 30. 
24 [d. at 38. 
25 [d. at 9. 
26 See Magagnini, supra note 4, at AI. 
27 See HAMILTON-MERRITT, supra note 2, at 80. 
28 See CASTLE, supra note 5, at 38. 
29 [d. at 38. 
30 HAMILTON-MERRITT, supra note 2, at 86. The Hmong may have fought the Communist 
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ises to the Hmong that they would provide assistance in fighting the 
communist forces, and they also assured the Hmong of assistance in 
case the war was lost.31 
The CIA actively recruited the Hmong, hoping they could be used 
to support the royalist government of Laos.32 They offered to increase 
the living standards of the Hmong by developing pig breeding centers 
and teaching them carpentry, to develop a sense of national identity 
among the Hmong.33 These CIA officers also traveled around to the 
Hmong villages with interpreters, telling the people that "the Vietnam-
ese will soon come to take your land. We [the United States] will give 
you the means to fight and defend your homes. "34 The Hmong ac-
cepted the help of the CIA, and soon, several thousand Hmong had 
new weapons and were being trained by the CIA.35 However, the United 
States did not undertake any formal treaties or agreements with the 
Hmong, since the war in Laos was officially clandestine.36 The plan in 
the United States was to keep the North Vietnamese army and the 
Pathet Lao at bay until a diplomatic solution could be negotiated.37 
The Hmong fought valiantly, often rescuing downed American 
pilots, watching the movements of the enemy forces, and fighting the 
ground war.38 Eventually, approximately 60 percent of the 300,000 
Hmong in Laos joined in the war against the communist forces. 39 At 
its peak, the Hmong army numbered nearly 40,000.40 The Hmong 
fought bravely, and they sustained staggering losses in the warY 
In 1973, concurrent with talks involving the United States con-
cerning the end to the conflict in Vietnam, the royal Laotian govern-
ment and the Pathet Lao began similar talks.42 On February 21, 1973, 
forces with or without the help of the Americans. It seems that they wanted arms, training, and 
food from the Americans. See id. at 89. 
31 W. Courtland Robinson, Laotian Refugees in Thailand, in LAos: BEYOND THE REVOLUTION 
215, 220 (Joseph J. Zasloff, Leonard Unger eds., 1991) (citing Department of Health and Human 
Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, The Hmong Resettlement Study, Vol. 1, 18 (1985) [here-
inafter Hmong Resettlement Study]). 
32 See THEODORE SHACKLEY, THE THIRD OPTION 71 (1981). 
33 See id. at 71-72. 
34CASTLE, supra note 5, at 38 (quoting various United States CIA officers). 
35Id. at 39. 
36 HAMILTON-MERRITT, supra note 2, at 226. 
37Id. at 95. 
3B See CASTLE, supra note 5, at 82; see also Kaufman, supra note 12. 
39 Kaufman, supra note 12. 
40 Robinson, supra note 31, at 217. 
41Id. (Between 1963 and 1971, 18,000 to 20,000 Hmong were killed in combat). 
42 CASTLE, supra note 5, at 115-16. 
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the Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos 
was signed.43 The Agreement required that foreign armed forces would 
completely cease all military activity in Laos.44 Yang Pao's Hmong army 
was assimilated into the royal army, and foreign assistance to the royal 
forces decreased.45 The communists took control, and on December 
1-2, 1975, the Pathet Lao established the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic (LPDR).46 
C. The Hmong Refugee Crisis 
By the time the LPDR had been established, the Hmong had 
already begun to flee Laos en masseY By the end of 1975, more than 
44,000 had fled into Thailand.48 On May 15,1975, approximately 3,000 
Hmong, including General Yang Pao, were airlifted into Thailand for 
safety.49 The Pathet Lao arrested royalist and anti-communist dissi-
dents and put them into "re-education camps" where they performed 
forced labor. 50 Approximately 10 percent of these dissidents died in the 
camps.51 
In 1975, the Thai government allowed the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to set up temporary camps, 
providing food, clothing, shelter and medical care for the influx of 
Indochinese refugees.52 The Thai government officially listed these 
people as displaced persons, since they entered in violation of the Thai 
Immigration Act.53 As displaced persons, they are prima facie illegal 
immigrants, subject to imprisonment, fines, and expulsion.54 The United 
43Id. at 117. 
44Id. at 118. 
45 See id. at 121, 125. 
46Id. at 127. 
47 Robinson, supra note 31, at 217. 
4S Id. at 217. Other groups also fled the newly-communist Laos at that time, but not nearly 
in the numbers of the Hmong. Id. at 218. 
49Id. at 217. Robinson suggests that fear of reprisals was not the only reason the Hmong left 
Laos. Id. He also points to the fear of massive starvation in the face of loss of food drops. Id. at 
217-18. 
50 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FORCED BACK AND FORGOTTEN THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF LAOTIAN AsYLUM SEEKERS IN THAILAND 6 (1989) [hereinafter FORCED BACK AND 
FORGOTTEN]. The Pathet Lao admit to having imprisoned some 10,000 to 15,000 persons, but 
defectors estimate the numbers to be between 30,000 and 60,000 persons. Id. 
51Id. 
52 Robinson, supra note 31, at 218. 
53Id. 
54Id. at 219. 
144 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:139 
States, after the fall of Laos to the Pathet Lao, began to allow resettle-
ment of Hmong refugees within its borders.55 
Even before they had taken power, the Pathet Lao called for the 
total elimination of the Hmong.56 The official publication of the Pathet 
Lao, the Khao-xane Pathet Lao, called for the Hmong to "be exterminated 
down to the root of the tribe. "57 When the communist government was 
installed in 1975, many Hmong who remained in Laos continued the 
resistance against the LPDR.58 During this time, the Hmong allege that 
the LPDR began to drop chemical toxins on the Hmong, including 
one called ''Yellow Rain. "59 The use of biological and chemical toxins 
against the Hmong most likely caused injury to thousands.60 
The possibility of "re-education," the poor state of the economy, 
food shortages, and especially the possibility of being resettled abroad, 
particularly in the United States, began to attract other Laotian people 
to the Thai refugee camps, and in 1978, the number of lowland Lao 
arrivals in Thailand reached 48,781.61 In 1979, President Carter an-
nounced that the United States would admit 168,000 Indochinese 
refugees in that year, but Thailand was still burdened with over a 
quarter of a million refugees.62 The conditions of the camps, along with 
the possibility of resettlement abroad were becoming too much of a 
lure for refugees for the Thai government, who in 1981, instituted a 
policy of "humane deterrence," which consisted of opening a camp 
with more austere conditions and no access to resettlement. 63 
55Id. at 220. 
56 FORCED BACK AND FORGOTTEN, supra note 50, at 8. 
57Id. at 7-8. 
58 See HAMILTON-MERRITT, supra note 2, at 378-89. In their desperation, some Hmong 
turned to a mystical group called the "Chao Fa"-Prince of the Sky. Id. at 381. This was a resistance 
group which promised a god-like intervention that would both protect them from being slain by 
an evil giant and give them the power to destroy the giant. Id. 
59 See id. at 454. Hamilton-Merritt discussed biological and chemical toxins that were used 
against the Hmong. Id. One soldier reported that " ... they [the planes] dropped poisons. There 
were three kinds used-yellow, black and blue ... When the yellow poison like rain came, people 
got dizzy with vomiting ... The black one .. .if touched or if breathed ... could kill you." Id. at 393. 
In meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1983, Matthew 
Meselson, a Harvard biochemist, advanced the proposition that the "yellow rain" was in fact only 
bee excrement, which was quickly picked up by the media and discredited the testimony of the 
Hmong. See id. at 454-60. 
60 See id. at 446-47. In 1982, Secretary of State Alexander Haig submitted a report to the 
Congress that determined that Laotian and Vietnamese forces had used chemical toxins in Laos 
since 1975. Id. at 446. 
61 Robinson, supra note 31, at 221-22. Other factors also contributed to this exodus, includ-
ing medicine shortages, food rationing, rice tax, arbitrary arrests, labor conscription, and work 
collectivization. Id. 
62Id. at 222-23. 
63Id. at 223-24. 
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To slow the influx of refugees, the United States passed the Refu-
gee Act of 198064 which restricted resettlement in the United States 
and provided for approval of resettlements on a case-by-case basis.65 
The Act caused the resettlement of Hmong in the United States to 
drop from 27,000 in 1980 to 3800 in 1981.66 There were additional 
reasons for the numbers of Hmong resettling in the United States to 
fall off. Hmong in the Thai camps began to refuse to resettle in 
Western countries, including the United States.67 Stories reached the 
camps about the difficult life ahead of them if they were to immigrate 
to the United States, since the resettled Hmong were the most welfare-
dependent group in the United States.68 General Yang Pao, who by this 
time had resettled in the United States himself, instructed refugees to 
remain in Thailand, since he continued to support a low-level resis-
tance against the Laotian government, which he eventually hoped 
would lead the Hmong back to Laos.69 Other potentially legitimate 
refugees were screened out of the process as well. Due to stricter 
United States drug laws, any immigrant or refugee needs to test drug-
free for five years, instead of six months as the case had been before.70 
The new policy screened out many potential refugees because of the 
Hmong use of opium as a traditional medicine.71 
Despite the resettlement efforts abroad, the populations in Thai-
land's camps were growing,72 while the number resettled in the United 
States was shrinking.73 In 1985, Thailand, backed by the UNHCR, the 
United States, and Canada, instituted a screening process intended to 
64 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8 USC §§ 1101 et seq (1988 & Supp. 
1992»; See Robinson, supra note 31, at 225. 
65 Robinson, supra note 31, at 225. 
66 Id. at 226. 
67 LYNELLYN D. LONG, BAN VINAl: THE REFUGEE CAMP 50 (1993). 
68 Marc Kaufman, As Return to Laos Nears, Hmong Hopes are Dashed: An Agreement Calls for 
12,000 to go Back I7y Mid-1995. Hmong Leaders Say the Communist Nation is Not Safe for Them, 
PHlLA. INQUIRER, Aug. 5, 1994, at A3. 
69 LONG, supra note 67, at 50. 
70 Kaufman, supra note 12. 
71Id. There are many cases of Hmong in trouble in the United States because of their use 
of opium. In U.S. v. Koua Thao, a hmong man was found guilty of knowingly and intentionally 
possessing opium with intent to distribute it when the opium came in a package in the mail to 
his address. 712 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1983). His convictions for using the United States mail 
to import opium and his conviction for intentionally importing opium were overturned since 
there was no evidence that he caused the opium to be sent. Id. However, in U.S. v. Vue, the use 
of testimony at trial from a customs supervisor that opium importation in his area was 95% due 
to the Hmong community violated the defendant's due process rights. 13 F.3d 1206, 1212-14 
(8th Cir. 1994). 
72 Robinson, supra note 31, at 221-22. 
73Id. at 226. 
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distinguish illegal immigrants-those who came across the border for 
purely economic reasons, from refugees-those who participated either 
in anti-communist activities or in the old regime.74 The Thai govern-
ment created another category of refugees, those persons with relatives 
in a third country, suggesting that Thailand now was willing only to 
allow in immigrants who had a reasonable chance of resettlement in 
a third country.75 
To become a legitimate refugee in Thailand, the potential migrant 
must pass through a screening process.76 This screening process begins 
with an initial interview by a representative of the Ministry of Interior 
(MOI).77 Potential immigrants who receive initial approval, that is, who 
are "screened-in," are sent to the provincial committee for confirma-
tion, and, once confirmed, are sent to the appropriate camp.78 If 
rejected, the UNHCR may appeaP9 Otherwise the applicant is put into 
a detention center to await repatriation.80 However, many of the poten-
tial asylum seekers are "screened-out" even before reaching the proc-
ess.8 ! There are widespread reports of bribery, the interview is cursory, 
and anyone suspected of having been smuggled in by third parties is 
forced back into Laos.82 Many refugees report paying from 2000 to 
36,000 baht ($80-$1500) just to enter the process or to obtain a 
favorable decision.83 
74 LONG, supra note 67, at 52. According to a Thai Ministry ofInterior (MOl) memo, refugees 
included: 
1. former officials, military, or police during the pre-LPDR period; 
2. persons who used to work in embassies, international organizations, foreign firms 
during the pre-LPDR period; 
3. persons who participated in political and social movements against the commu· 
nist governments. 
Illegal Immigrants included: 
1. persons who claim dissatisfaction with the new regime, owing to tax collection, 
forced labor or the draft; 
2. persons who desire to have a place for business because of their dissatisfaction 
with the LPDR economic system; 
3. persons influenced by others, especially Lao hill tribes; 
4. persons who claim relatives in Thailand or in a third country. 
Robinson, supra note 31, at 229. 
75 Robinson, supra note 31, at 229. 
76Id. 
77 Id. 
78Id. 
79Id. 
80 Robinson, supra note 31, at 229. 
8l FORCED BACK AND FORGOTTEN, supra note 50, at 24-26. 
82Id. 
83 Robinson, supra note 31, at 231. 
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In the late 1980s, the process to enter Thailand became even more 
restrictive since local officials were instructed by the MOl to allow fewer 
potential immigrants into the screening process.84 The Thai govern-
ment also used a method called the "pushback"-that is, attempting 
to stop the flow of immigrants at the border to decrease immigration.85 
In one report of a pushback, an eight-year-old girl was among thirty-
three Hmong who attempted to smuggle themselves over the Thai 
border on a raft. 86 Thai officials fired on the group, confiscated their 
money, and, the next day, put them on boats back to Laos.87 Reports 
indicate that upon arrival on the Laotian side of the Mekong river, the 
Pathet Lao took the group into the forest, where they were gunned 
down.88 The eight-year-old, the only survivor of the group, was shot but 
not killed;89 two days later, sixteen more Hmong were massacred in a 
similar incident.90 
Recently, diplomats from the various nations have addressed the 
refugee problem in Southeast Asia, and in 1991, the governments of 
Thailand and Laos, along with the UNHCR signed the Luang Prabang 
Agreement.91 The Luang Prabang Agreement provided for the repa-
triation of the refugees from Laos, and the closing of the camps by the 
end of 1994.92 The Laotian government had still refused to accept 
refugees who had been screened-out by the Thai government.93 Laotian 
officials admit that some members of the government still fear and dislike 
the Hmong, but the official government position is one of reconcili-
ation.94 The Hmong were not consulted, nor even allowed to participate 
in the framing of this agreement.95 The Agreement has been difficult 
to implement, both because the Hmong have been and are still openly 
hostile to the government of Laos, and also because of the continuing 
low-level resistance fought against the LPDR by the Hmong.96 
84 See FORCED BACK AND FORGOTTEN. supra note 50, at 26. 
85 See id. at 13-14. 
86 [d. at 16. 
87 [d. 
88 [d. at 17. 
89 [d. 
90 [d. 
91 Kaufman, supra note 12. 
92 [d. 
93 Robinson, supra note 31, at 231 
94 Kaufman, supra note 12. 
95 [d. 
96 See Kaufman, supra note 11, at C5. See also Raids 'Staged from Thailand '-Hill Tribe Rebels, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 30, 1993, at 11. 
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The voluntary approach to repatriation left unresolved problems 
for the parties to the 1991 agreement, not the least of which was that 
many of the refugees were unwilling to return to Laos.97 The United 
States attempted to find a Hmong leader who would be willing to lead 
back Hmong to Laos, in the hope that others would follow suit.98 In 
early 1991, the United States government thought they had found the 
leader in Vue Mai, a fifty-seven-year-old Hmong who had been a major 
in the CIA's secret army in the war in Laos.99 
Vue Mai had continued to fight the communists for another dec-
ade after Laos fell to them in 1975.100 Vue Mai was assured by United 
States and UNHCR officials that his return to Laos would be safe, and 
his clan agreed to follow him.101 He crossed the Mekong river into Laos 
in November 1992.102 Upon return, Vue Mai was frustrated by delays 
in promised United States money and difficulties in finding adequate 
resettlement areas.103 On September 11, 1993, ten months after return-
ing to Laos, Vue Mai was reported missing and has not been heard 
from since.104 
Subsequently, the Vue clan refused to migrate to Laos. 105 However, 
the entire clan has been labeled traitors by the other clans left in the 
camps, ostracized from the rest of the Hmong community for deciding 
to return to Laos.l06 
Various governments and agencies blamed each other for the 
disappearance of Vue Mai.107 The United States and the UNHCR faulted 
the continued Hmong resistance for the disappearance, since these 
groups would have the most to gain from this.108 The Laotian govern-
ment has denied any knowledge of the cause of Vue Mai's disappear-
ance, but relatives of Vue Mai view this skeptically, since an LPDR 
officer was assigned to follow him wherever he went.109 The Laotian 
97 See Kaufman, supra note II, at CS. 
98 Marc Kaufman, Hmong Leader's Vanishing in Laos Reverberates in the U.S., PHILA. INQUIRER, 
May I, 1994, at AI. 
991d. 
1001d. 
101 Kaufman, supra note 12. 
1021d. 
1031d. 
1041d. 
105 Kaufman, supra note 98, at AI. 
1061d. 
1071d. 
108Kaufman, supra note 12. 
109 Kaufman, supra note 98, at AI. 
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government proffered the hypothesis that Vue Mai may have run off 
with a girlfriend, but deny any other knowledge. llo If the Laotian 
government had knowledge that the resistance had taken him, it is 
probable that they would have made it public, since a kidnapping by 
one of their own would have given them a chance to discredit the 
resistance. lll In the week of November 18, 1994, Representative Ben-
jamin A. Gilman, a Republican from New York, accused the Laotian 
and Vietnamese governments of kidnapping Vue Mai, and stated that 
he had information to this effect.ll2 However, the U.S. has been unwill-
ing to press the Laotian government on this claim. ll3 
The disappearance of Vue Mai did not put an end to repatriation; 
in fact, repatriations to Laos have sped upY4 Thousands of refugees from 
the various camps were repatriated in the early 1990s, and the schedule 
for closing the last refugee camp in Thailand available to Laotians is 
set for the end of 1995.ll5 By the second half of 1994, all of the refugee 
camps for Laotian refugees in Thailand had been closed with the 
exception of the Ban Na Pho camp, which held about 11,000 people, 
and these refugees are expected to be repatriated by the end of 1995.116 
All of the refugees are supposed to have returned "voluntarily." 
However, the definition of "voluntary" varies greatly between the vari-
ous parties. ll7 The United States and the UNHCR believe since all of 
the refugees that have returned have signed documents stating that 
they are returning voluntarily, that their repatriation is indeed volun-
tary.llS However, many of these people are given the choice between 
repatriation and being sent to a prison-like detention center until they 
decide that they are willing to go back to Laos.ll9 Some have even been 
arrested for protesting the "voluntary" repatriations, and placed in the 
detention camps.120 These officials insist that, even though the Hmong 
have no choice but to return to Laos, they are not being forced. 121 
110 Kaufman, supra note 12. 
m See Kaufman, supra note 98, at AI. 
112 Marc Kaufman, Laos Accused of Seizing a T&jJ Refugee-U. S. Should not Support Repatriation, 
Lawmaker Says, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 18, 1994, at A3. 
113 See id. 
114 [d. 
115 [d. 
116 [d. 
117 See Kaufman, supra note 12. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. 
120 Kaufman, supra note 1, at A2. 
121 Kaufman, supra note 68, at A3. 
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Officials from the United States and the UNHCR say that they will use 
forcible repatriation if necessary, which may include methods such as 
handcuffs, chains, and tear gas, which were the methods used by Hong 
Kong authorities when they faced a similar situation with Vietnamese 
refugees. 122 These officials claim that the Hmong are trying to stir up 
trouble at the urging of Vang Pao, and that the refugees do not want 
to leave the camps since life for them there is relatively easy.123 
The Hmong tell a different version of the story. They accuse the 
Thai government of forcing refugees to sign agreements at gun point.124 
They also point to the disappearance of Vue Mai and deny that they 
are willing to go back to Laos. 125 
Upon return to Laos, the UNHCR has promised that each person 
would receive financial aid of 3000 baht and that each family would 
be given fifteen rai (two hectares) ofland.126 UNHCR officials also deny 
that any abuse is being inflicted on the refugees upon their return. 127 
The Laotian government is in charge of finding areas for the refugees 
to repatriate.128 They have repatriated the Hmong to various regions 
in smaller settlements rather than returning them to their former 
homeland or keeping them together as a group.129 The Laotian gov-
ernment cites environmental reasons for not allowing the Hmong to 
return to their ancestral sites, since their slash-and-burn farming is 
destructive. 130 However, a possible political reason for keeping the 
Hmong separated would be to keep them under greater control, since 
there is still ongoing resistance.131 
The Hmong say that it is not safe to return to their former home-
land.132 Pobzeb Vang, the chairman of the Lao Human Rights Council, 
testified in April, 1994 that those Hmong that have returned to Laos 
in the 1990s have faced persecution and even death upon their re-
122 See Kaufman, supra note 1, at A2. 
123Kaufman, supra note 12. 
124Id. 
125 See Kaufman, supra note 11, at CS. 
126 Hmong Refugees Begin Journey Home, BANGKOK POST, June 30, 1994, available in WEST-
LAW, INT-NEWS File. 
127 Kaufman, supra note 68, at A3. 
128 See Laotian Refugees to be Returned in Phases, BANGKOK POST, July 28, 1994, available in 
WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File. 
129Kaufman, supra note 12. 
130Id. 
131Id. 
132 See generally Marc Kaufman, A Friendly People's Republic-Laos' Dour Communist Regime Is 
Only Beginning to Seek Western Visitors, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 11, 1994, at Tl. 
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turn. 133 The Hmong fear returning to Laos since It IS not an open 
country which would make it difficult for others to monitor their 
safety. 134 Other outside observers are critical of the agreement to return 
the Hmong to Laos.135 Representative Pat Schroeder was concerned 
because of the "well-documented cases of mandatory repatriation of 
Hmong to Laos and gross violations of human rights by the Laotian 
government, which has closed Laos to all monitoring by independent 
human rights organizations."136 The United States is trying to improve 
relations with its neighbors in Southeast Asia because of the allure of 
larger markets and raw materials. 137 
The situation of the Hmong was taken up again by the United 
States government in the summer of 1995.138 The United States House 
of Representatives passed a bill which would make Laotian or Vietnam-
ese Hmong priority groups in immigration quotas. 139 This bill would 
appropriate $30 million for their resettlement. 140 The measure has 
foreign officials concerned, since it may lead to a new wave of refu-
gees. 141 However, the bill is still before the Senate. 
III. LEGAL CLAIMS OF THE HMONG 
A. Claims in United States Courts 
Many scholars perceive a responsibility on the part of the United 
States to assist the Hmong. 142 This is evidenced by the efforts that are 
still taking place in the United States.143 The United States continues 
to attempt to rectify the refugee situation of the Hmong.144 These 
133Kaufman, supra note 3, atA7. 
134Kaufman, supra note 12. 
135 See generally BANGKOK POST, supra note 9. 
136Id. 
137 See Kaufman, supra note 12. 
138 7/18/95 Congo Q. Wkly. Rep. 2074 available in WESTLAW, CONGQTWR File. 
139 Hong Kong's Camp of Tears, ECONOMIST, May 27, 1995, available in WESTLAW, INT-
NEWS File. 
14oId. 
141Id. 
142 Refugee Committee Urges Sensitivity in Handling Remaining Indochinese Asylum Seekers in 
Thailand, PRo NEWSWIRE, Mar. 29, 1995, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File; Hiram Ruiz, The 
Hmong Supported Us, Now They Need Our Support, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 23, 1994, at A9. 
143Patrick]asperse, House Backs Bill to Open Up U.S. to More Refugees, MILWAUKEE]OURNAL 
SENTINEL, May 25, 1995, at 3A. Rep. Steve Gunderson stated that this was the most important 
vote in Congress since the authorization of military force in the Persian Gulf, and that this would 
prevent torture and eventual death of these people. Id. 
144 See id. 
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however are moral arguments and do not invoke legal obligations. 
Another scholar stated, "To the extent that a state or society or insti-
tution has contributed to the causes of the creation and flow of refugees, 
there is an obligation to extend relief and refuge to those refugees."145 
It can be argued that the United States is indebted to the Hmong 
and that debt goes beyond mere moral responsibility.l46 The CIA sought 
help in its covert war against the communist forces in Laos, and the 
Hmong were actively recruited. 147 The United States, however, never 
entered into a formal treaty or agreement with the Hmong. In secret 
hearings in 1969 before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, 
William Sullivan, the former director of American actions in Laos, 
responded to a question on the continuous supplying ofVang Pao and 
his army to fight the communists.148 He testified that there was no 
formal obligation on the part of the United States to the Hmong. 149 
He further stated that it was important to keep the war secret since 
Kennedy and Khrushchev had come to an "understanding" in Vienna 
in 1961.150 This understanding amounted to the Soviets and the United 
States both ignoring the other's presence in Laos, and thus, according 
to top officials at the time of the war, the United States had more of a 
commitment to the Soviet Union than it did with the Hmong. 151 
The Hmong could claim that they had a "contract" with the 
United States government. They state that they have been abandoned 
by the United States, not only when Laos fell to the Communists in 
1975, but also now as they are being forced to repatriate against their 
will.152 The Department of Health and Human Services found that 
"assurances were made by U.S. officials to support the Hmong during 
the war, and to provide them with assistance in the event that Laos was 
lost to the Communists. "153 CIA officials also traveled from village to 
145 Charles S. Milligan, Ethical Aspects of Refugee Issues and U.S. Policy, in REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 172 (1989). 
146 See Kaufman, supra note 3, at A7. In 1994 Congressional Testimony, the Chairman of the 
Lao Human Rights Council discussed the refugee problem with the acting director of the State 
Department Bureau of Refugee Affairs: "There were, however, two points on which the speakers 
basically agreed: that the United States had a special obligation to the Hmong dating back to the 
Vietnam War years, but that the obligation was coming to an end." Id. 
147 See HAMILTON-MERRITT, supra note 2, at 86. 
148Id. at 226-27. 
149Id. 
150 See id. at 227. 
151 Id. at 228. 
152 See Kaufman, supra note 11, at C5. 
153Robinson, supra note 31, at 220, (citing Hmong Resettlement Study, Vol. 1, 18). 
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village stating that the United States would give the Hmong the means 
to fight and defend their homes.154 This would most certainly constitute 
bargained-for consideration. There was no express limit to the time 
those fighting materials would be provided. Mter the United States left, 
tens of thousands of Hmong, including families and clans in Laos, were 
left without assistance.155 Many of these people made the trek out of 
Laos on foot and by boat across the Mekong River.156 
The Hmong, however, had been fighting the Communist aggres-
sors anyway, and the United States seemed only to be supplying them 
with arms and training.157 The Hmong would likely have lost the war 
against the Communist forces without the assistance of the United 
States.l58 The United States continued to assist the Hmong after the 
LPDR takeover. 159 The United States assisted in air-evacuating approxi-
mately 3,000 Hmong, including General Vang Pao, to safety.l60 The 
United States also allowed many thousands of Hmong to emigrate. 161 
The Hmong, though, could hardly have believed that the Ameri-
can obligation to their people would last indefinitely.162 The United 
States government was, in fact, only abiding by the terms of the Vien-
tiane Agreement of 1973, when foreign military activity in Laos was 
banned.163 
The Hmong also probably lessened the weight of any possible 
contractual claim that they might have had by continuing to fight the 
Communists after the United States pulled out in 1975. The low level 
resistance has been deemed "cruel" and "unnecessary," and General 
154CASTLE, supra note 5, at 38. 
155 See generally HAMILTON-MERRITT, supra note 2, at 355-77. 
156Robinson, supra note 31, at 217. 
157This is demonstrated by the fact that the Hmong resistance continues to fight the Com-
munist Government of Laos even until today, even without the support of other countries. See, 
e.g., Ministry Rejects Call to Stop Repatriation, BANGKOK POST, May 19, 1995, at 2, available in 
WESTlAW, INT-NEWS File. 
158 See CASTLE, supra note 5, at 110. By 1968, the Hmong had begun to fight conventional 
actions against North Vietnamese forces, which devastated the Hmong. The casualties forced 
Vang Pao to recruit thirteen- and fourteen-year olds. Id. 
159 See Robinson, supra note 31, at 217, 223. 
160 Id. at 217. 
161 Id. at 223. 
162 See Jasperse, supra note 143, at 3A. Representative Toby Roth, in May of 1995, stated that 
the Vietnam War was twenty years old and that more immigrants from that area should not be 
brought in to the country. He finds that there is a greater obligation to the taxpayers of the U.S. 
Id. 
163 CASTLE, supra note 5, at 118. 
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Yang Pao's continued financing and support of the war has been 
discredited by the United States government. l64 
The Hmong could also attempt to bring a claim against the United 
States for a violation of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees, a United Nations Treaty to which the United 
States is a signatory.165 To press a claim against the United States, the 
Hmong would have to establish that they were members of a protected 
class, that they had standing to sue in United States courts, and that 
by funding the forced repatriation, the United States was forcing the 
Hmong to return to a country where they had a genuine fear of 
persecution.166 As defined by the convention, a refugee is one who: 
owing to well-rounded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular so-
cial group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence ... , is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it.167 
Thus, in order for the Hmong to be established as refugees under 
the convention, it must be found that they have a legitimate fear of 
persecution because of their ethnicity in Laos.16B 
The United States has a specific standard for granting refugee 
status, that of "well-founded fear of persecution. "169 The standard is the 
same in the Convention as it is in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) .170 This standard of well-founded fear involves both a subjective 
and an objective part. 171 One must not only have the subjective fear of 
persecution, but this fear must also be grounded in objective reality; 
there must be facts that demonstrate that persecution may occur.172 
These facts need not, however, demonstrate a greater than 50% chance 
164Kaufman, supra note 11, at C5. 
165 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS, 
HUMAN RiGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 294 (1988). 
166 Id. 
167Id. at art. 1, 'lI A(2). 
168 Id. 
169 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.s. 421, 430 (1987). 
170 See Carcamo-Fiores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 62 (2nd Cir. 1986); Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1101 et seq. 
17l Id. 
172 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430. 
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of persecution.173 Taking for granted that the Hmong, as a group, have 
a subjective fear of persecution, the Hmong would still have to show 
facts that support the likelihood that they may be persecuted.174 
In Garcia-Ramos v. INS., a person who, as a member of an anti-gov-
ernmental organization, participated in public demonstrations, planted 
fake bombs, acted as an armed guard to hunger strikers, and distrib-
uted political propaganda was found to have satisfied the standard of 
well-founded fear of persecution. 175 However, in Gutierrez-Rngue v. INS., 
the court found that the moving party had not made out a reasonable 
fear of persecution.176 This woman lived in Nicaragua and her husband 
was a Contra.177 She had been forced to spend a year in Cuba teaching 
and studying Marxism, had her food rationing card taken away, had 
death threats made against her, and was threatened to be forced to dig 
trenches for the government.178 However, her claim was defeated since 
she did not make a sufficient showing of a well-founded fear of perse-
cution because the Sandinistas, the persecuting group, no longer held 
power.179 A group or a person, in order to show a well-founded fear of 
persecution, must have taken active steps against the persecuting group. ISO 
The Hmong, as a group, seem to have suffered the persecution 
that would be required for a group to qualifY for refugee statuS.181 They 
have fought an on-going rebellion against the LPDR since the party 
took power in 1975. They have been singled out by the LPDR as a 
group for extermination because of their activities. 182 The disappear-
ance of Vue Mai upon his return to Laos also tends to justifY the fear 
that the Hmong have of persecution upon their return.183 Finally, the 
lack of openness of the Laotian government also fosters real fear in 
the Hmong of returning to Laos.184 
173 Id. 
174 See id. 
175 775 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985). 
176 954 F.2d 769, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
177 Id. 
178Id. 
179 Id. at 772. 
180 See id. 
181 See generally HAMILTON-MERRITI, supra note 2, at 337-51. 
182 Id. at 528. In 1975, the LPDR, on its own official radio, stated that it intended to "wipe 
out" the Hmong and asked others to join the goal. Id. 
183 See Kaufman, supra note 112, at A3. Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman claims that he has infor-
mation that Vue Mai was abducted by "Unit 53, an LPDR undercover police unit trained by the 
Vietnamese. Id. 
184 See generally Kaufman, supra note 98, at AI. 
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Despite the fact that they were singled out as a group when the 
LPDR first gained power, UNHCR and United States officials state that 
the Hmong have not presented substantial concrete evidence of per-
secution upon re-entering Laos.185 Furthermore, the Laotian govern-
ment has denied any disparate treatment among the people who re-
turn to their country.186 Laos could attempt to justify this treatment as 
a way for the new government to secure political power. Laos has 
attempted to improve relations with the rest of the world, and they 
could argue that the ruling government does not wish to cause harm 
to the Hmong, as this would jeopardize their standing internationally. 
The Hmong make allegations that they are treated differently upon 
their return to Laos, but this could be seen as self-serving, since they 
do not, as a group, wish to return to Laos until the strict regime no 
longer controls.187 The major powers involved, especially the UNHCR, 
deny the problems that the Hmong allege upon returning to Laos.!88 
Further, allegations of responsibility for the disappearance of Vue Mai 
have been leveled not only against the Laotian government, but also 
against the Hmong.189 The Hmong resistance would clearly have the 
most to gain by the disappearance of this leader. 190 The disappearance 
increases international attention to their plight which could cause major 
powers involved to take a second look at the process of repatriation.191 
In light of all the facts involved in their plight, it is probable that 
the Hmong would be considered to be refugees under the Convention, 
or at least under the United States definition of refugee.192 They have 
a reasonable fear of persecution in Laos. The Hmong in Thailand, 
185 See Kaufman, supra note 3, at A7. Probzeb Vang, the chairman of the Lao Human Rights 
Council, claims to have information that Hmong who have been returned to Laos have faced 
persecution and even death, but the State Department and the United Nations deny that there 
is any abuse occurring at all. Id. But see Hamilton-Merritt, Sanctuary for the Hmong, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 25, 1994, at A17. Tens of thousands of Hmong have fled camps in fear of repatriation. One 
Hmong, living in the United States, received a phone call from relatives in Thailand, alleging 
forced repatriation. Id. 
186 See BANGKOK POST, supra note 9. 
187 See, e.g., Hmong Repatriation to Laos, 1994: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian Pacific 
Affairs, (statement of Pa Kao Her, President of the Democratic Chao Fa Party of Laos), available 
in WESTLAW, USTESTIMONY File; Hmong Man Fights to Save Brother from Repatriation, MIL-
WAUKEE]', Mar. 13, 1995, available in WESTLAW, NPM] File. 
188 See Kaufman, supra note 3, at A7. 
189 Kaufman, supra note 98, at AI. Lao and State Department officials claim the Hmong are 
the likely abductors of Vue Mai. Id. 
190Id. 
191 See id. 
192 See Cardoz.a-Fonseca, 480 U.S at 430-31. 
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especially those that fought in the war, are fleeing from a government 
that has persecuted them, and is still unwilling to allow other outside 
organizations to watch over the Hmong upon their return. 
If the Hmong in Thailand qualify for refugee status, which the 
Thai government frequently denies, labeling most border-crossers ille-
gal immigrants rather than refugees, they would still likely fit the 
United States definition of refugee. However, to win a claim against 
the United States government, the Hmong would still have to establish 
a violation of Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.193 
Article 33 reads: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ("re-
fouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of terri-
tories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. "194 Assuming Laos to be a place where Hmong life 
would be threatened, this Article would deny to any signatories the 
right to send a Hmong refugee back to Laos.195 This concept of nonre-
joulement has a specific legal meaning.196 Some scholars state that this 
principle is independent of any legal refugee status, and that a state 
which returns foreign nationals to a country with a poor record of 
human rights abuses has the burden of justifying its actions in light of 
the conditions in the country of origin.197 This principle, however, does 
not entail any particular solution such as asylum, admission, or resi-
dence.19B The only binding obligation upon a signatory is to refrain 
from sending a refugee to a country where his life or freedom may be 
threatened.199 
The United States has accepted Article 33 of this Convention, and 
therefore, the obligations extend to actions of the United States.200 In 
order to be held to the standards of the Convention, though, the 
193 HUMAN RIGHTS COMPILATION, supra note 165, at 306, art. 33, t 1. 
194Id. 
195Id. 
196GUNNEL STENBERG, NON-EXPULSION AND NON-REFOULEMENT 21 (1989). Non-refoule-
ment is a prohibition on a state from sending a refugee to a country where he risks persecution. 
This encompasses rejection at the frontier, expulsion or extradition. Id. But see Sale v. Haitian 
Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549, 2564 (1993) (refouler refers only to an alien already within 
a territory). 
197 GUY S. GoODWIN-GILL, Nonrefoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW AsYLUM 
SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAw IN THE 1980s 103, 105 (David A. Martin ed., 1988). 
198Id. at 106. 
199 Id. 
200Gil Loescher & Ann Dull Loescher, THE GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS 90 (1994). The United 
States is a signatory to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which incorporates 
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. HUMAN RIGHTS COMPILATION, supra note 165, at 311. 
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United States itself must be returning the refugees, and the United 
States could deny the allegations, claiming no responsibility. The UNHCR 
and Thailand signed the agreement to return the Hmong to Laos with 
the United States not being a direct participant.201 The United States 
is merely providing financial support to the process.202 However, the 
Hmong could press their claim by alleging that, by providing financial 
support, the United States is constructively returning the refugees. 
This would be a novel approach on an international level. 
Even if the aforementioned situation existed, that is, the Hmong 
were refugees in the legal sense of the term, they had a well-founded 
fear of persecution, and that the United States was, in effect, returning 
them through the funding of involuntary repatriation, the Hmong 
would face the additional hurdle of having standing to sue in the 
United States, without which they probably could not even obtain a 
judgment.203 Since the Hmong are not on United States soil, and they 
are not citizens or resident aliens, they would not have the protection 
of the United States Constitution.204 However, in Haitian Refugee Center, 
Inc. v. Gracey, a nonprofit membership corporation, which sole purpose 
was to promote the well being of Haitian Refugees through various 
programs and activities, including legal representation, had standing 
based upon its own interests in providing counseling to bring action 
in federal court to challenge the interdiction of visa-less aliens on the 
high seas.205 The Hmong could perhaps set up a similar organization. 
A challenge recently came before the Supreme Court which, in 
many respects, could be similar to a claim that the Hmong could make 
out against the United States government.206 In a 1993 decision, Sale 
v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., various organizations, including Hai-
tian aliens brought suit against the United States government to enjoin 
it from returning interdicted aliens to Haiti207 under two statutes: 
Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and § 243(h)(1) of the 
INA.208 The court found that § 243(h) (1) did not apply to actions of 
201 Kaufman, supra note 12. 
202 Ruiz, supra note 142, at A9. 
203 See Cuban American Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1422-23 (11 Cir. 1995). 
204Id. at 1428, 1429. In this case, Cuban refugees who were on a United States base in Cuba 
were found not to have due process, equal protection, or First Amendment rights under the 
United States Constitution. Id. 
205 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1402 (D.D.C. 1985). 
206 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993). 
207Id. 
208Id. at 2551. 
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the United States outside its own borders.209 The court found that the 
language of this act applied solely to procedures by which the Attorney 
General determines whether deportable and excludable aliens may 
remain in the United States.210 In that case, an Executive Order direct-
ing the Coast Guard to intercept vessels outside the territorial waters 
of the United States which were illegally transporting passengers from 
Haiti to the United States without first determining whether the people 
qualified as refugees, was challenged.211 Section 243(h)(1) provides 
that "[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to 
a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or 
freedom would be threatened in such country .... "212 The District 
Court made an uncontested finding that "hundreds of Haitians have 
been killed, tortured, detained without a warrant, or subjected to 
violence and the destruction of their property because of their political 
beliefs. Thousands have been forced into hiding."213 
The Court also examined the Haitian claim under Article 33 of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention.214 The Court looked to the plain lan-
guage of the article and found that the French term "refouler" is not 
an exact synonym for the word return; rather they found that the term 
should be translated more along the lines of "repulse" or "expel."215 
Thus, the Court found that refouler means " ... a defensive act at the 
border rather than an act of transporting someone to a particular 
destination," and therefore the Article (and the subsequent 1967 Pro-
tocol relating to the Status of Refugees) was not intended to govern 
parties' conduct outside of their national borders.216 
In light of this recent decision of the Supreme Court, the Hmong 
would have a limited chance of winning their claim against the United 
States government in a United States court for funding the repatria-
tion.217 Even if there was clear and convincing evidence that Hmong 
209 [d. at 2562. 
210 Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2562. 
211 [d. at 2550. 
212 8 U.S.C. §1253(h). 
213113 S.Ct. at 2554. 
214 [d. at 2564. 
215 [d. 
216 [d. at 2564--65. However, in a powerful dissent, justice Blackmun found fault with various 
parts of the majority decision. He first determined that the Refugee Act of 1980 was meant to 
conform with Article 33. He then stated that the language of Article 33 was unambiguous and 
that vulnerable refugees should not be returned. [d. at 2568. He found no geographical limita-
tions to Article 33. [d. at 2570. Finally, he found the same to be true for §243(h). [d. at 2573. 
217 See Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2562; Cuban American Bar Ass'n, 43 F.3d at 1428-29. 
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were being subjected to persecution upon their return, the Supreme 
Court requires the United States to be acting within its own territory, 
and the fact that the Hmong are being expelled from Thailand would 
seem to be a bar to their claim.218 
Even if the Hmong could convince the United States courts of the 
legitimacy of its claim, there is a strong possibility that the judiciary 
would refuse to overrule the Executive Branch.2lg This type of case 
brings up Constitutional claims of the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, 
and the proper role of separation of powers. 220 Often, the judiciary is 
extremely deferential to the will of the Executive Branch in matters of 
foreign affairs,221 which is the situation here. Also, the government is 
willing and perhaps anxious to hide the scars of a long-lasting, costly 
war.222 However, in Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicara-
gua v. Reagan, a group of United States citizens brought suit against 
their government to stop the funding of the Contras in Nicaragua, and 
the court refused to apply a blanket use of the political question 
doctrine.223 No violations were found since United States statutory law 
supersedes any applicable internationallaw.224 
The Hmong could also try to press a claim against the United 
States for a violation of Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.225 
Article 3 reads very much like Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion. It states: 
l. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite 
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds 
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture. 
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such 
grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all 
relevant considerations including, where applicable, the ex-
218 BANGKOK POST, supra note 128. 
21913A FED. PRAC. & PROC. ]URIS.2d § 3534. Questions which are, by their nature political 
or submitted to the executive branch, cannot be decided by the judiciary. Id. 
220 See id. 
221 See, e.g., Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, Receiver, 376 U.S. 398 (l964). 
222 See Kaufman, supra note 12. 
223 859 F.2d 929, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see 13A FED. PRAC. & PROC. ]URIS.2d § 3534 (political 
question is one which the executive, or its officers, perform duties in which they have a discre-
tion).Id. 
224 859 F.2d at 938-39. 
225 HUMAN RIGHTS COMPILATION, supra note 165, 212, art. 3. 
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istence in the State concerned of a consisten t pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights. 226 
161 
This article explicitly demands that the proper authorities look at 
the past abuses of the country.227 However, the Hmong would need 
to overcome much the same problems they would have with Article 
33. The United States government denies continuing abuses by the 
Laotian government, and has been willing to assist the Thai and the 
Laotian governments in solving the Hmong refugee problem.228 
However, the Hmong fear returning to Laos, since they have been 
openly persecuted there for many years. 229 They then run into the 
same problem of proving a substantial risk of torture upon return. 
Even if the Hmong could win a suit against the United States in 
the United States courts on violations of UN treaties, a durable solution 
would be difficult for the court to fashion. At best, the government 
could be enjoined from providing assistance to the repatriation of the 
Hmong. Discretion to allow refugees into the United States lies in the 
hands of the Attorney General, who is not required to accept new 
refugees.23o The problems of the Hmong, in the words of Judge Ed-
wards, quoted in the Sale case, seem to " ... present[] a painfully com-
mon situation in which desperate people, convinced that they can no 
longer remain in their homeland, take desperate measures to escape. 
Although the human crisis is compelling, there is no solution to be 
found in a judicial remedy. "231 
B. Other Claims of the Hmong 
The quote by Judge Edwards, while relevant for the claims of the 
Hmong in United States courts, is even more valid internationally. The 
Hmong could attempt to pursue a claim against the United States in 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the United States 
unilaterally withdrew from the ICJ's jurisdiction during the Nicaraguan 
crisis in the Reagan years.232 For the Hmong to challenge the United 
226Id. 
227 [d. 
228 Hamilton-Merritt, supra note 185, at A17. 
229 See generally HAMILTON-MERRITT, supra note 2, at 337-51. 
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231 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549, 2567 (1993) (quotingJudge Edwards' 
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States in the IC], the United States would have to submit to the IC]'s 
jurisdiction.233 The United States would probably refuse to do so rather 
than cede any authority over their foreign affairs to an international body. 
Even if the United States did assent to jurisdiction of the IC], the 
Hmong would still have a further obstacle, since, under international 
law, the claim of the citizen is the claim of the state.234 Stated another 
way, an individual does not have standing in the international court.235 
In this case, all of the relevant governments, the United States, Laos, 
and Thailand, have all supported the repatriation of the Thai refu-
gees.236 It would be highly unlikely that a government would press a 
claim against its interests. The Laotian Government is interested in 
increasing their stature internationally to attract foreign investment, 
so they are willing to accept the refugees back.237 The lack of individual 
standing prevents claims not only against the United States, but also 
against Thailand and Laos as welI.238 Perhaps an international organi-
zation could take up the claim, but with the UNHCR leading the way 
in the repatriation of the Hmong, this also seems highly unlikely. 
The Hmong could attempt to have their claims entertained in the 
courts of Thailand. These claims, however, would also be unlikely to 
succeed. Since the initial influx of aliens, the Thai Government has 
consistently considered most of the aliens as illegal immigrants and not 
refugees.239 The Thai Government does not recognize any abuses tak-
ing place on the return of the Hmong.240 Historically, the Thai Gov-
ernment has been placed in a difficult situation. Since the time of the 
Vietnam War, their land has become the depository of hundreds of 
thousands of refugees, including the Hmong.241 These refugees have 
fled their lands for a variety of reasons: some have fled because of 
persecution, others because of economic difficulties, and others because 
of fear of war.242 The Thai Government has accepted these refugees at 
great cost to its own country. It is understandable to see that the Thai 
233 See id. 
234 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 846-47 (Sir RobertJennings & Sir Arthur Watts, eds., 
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Government wants to find a durable solution, not only to the plight of 
the Hmong, but also for the thousands of other refugees that have or 
are inhabiting their land.243 
The Hmong would also have difficulties winning a claim in the 
international courts against Thailand. If they could overcome the prob-
lem of the claim being taken up by some national body, they would 
face an additional problem: Thailand is also not a signatory to the 1951 
Refugee Convention.244 Thus, the standards and obligations of that 
Convention do not apply to Thailand, unless it could be successfully 
argued that the 1951 Refugee Convention has become a matter of 
customary international law, which some of the European courts have 
accepted.245 However, there is a variety of opinions regarding the rights 
of refugees and interpretations of the Convention (and subsequent 
Protocol) .246 This would impede any possible claim that the Convention 
is a matter of customary international law. Also, any claim against the 
Thai Government would likely result in Thai officials speeding up the 
process of repatriation. 
If the Hmong were to attempt to win a suit against Laos, they 
would have a nearly impossible time once again, as they would be 
confronted with the difficulty of having an international organization 
or a national body pick up their claim. As long as Laos stays clear of 
violations of international agreements or customary international law, 
or as long as no foreign power is willing to challenge them, they have 
the right to control within their own borders. It appears increasingly 
likely that no foreign power would be willing to challenge the Laotian 
Government in light of the difficulties that the UN is currently facing 
in sorting the ethnic difficulties in the former Yugoslavia.247 The con-
tinued low-level resistance by Hmong may also become a mitigating 
factor in any international decision.248 
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The Hmong could also attempt to press claims of genocide against 
the Laotian Government if they could get an international body to pick 
up their claim. However, there are complicating factors. First, the 
"yellow rain" charges have been denied, and scientists have offered 
other explanations for this experience, which, to some degree, have 
been accepted.249 The Hmong, though, state that they would have 
access to credible evidence that the poison bombing occurred. 250 When 
this evidence is combined with the official stance of the Laotian Gov-
ernment in 1975,251 a government which made an effort to exterminate 
the Hmong, the evidence on their side may be found compelling. 
Hurdles, however, would still remain in their way. By the time an 
international claim of genocide would be litigated, the Hmong most 
likely will have been returned to Laos, since the repatriation process 
has sped up. Any claim against the Laotian Government may, in fact, 
weaken their position upon their return, since there is no adequate 
international body to watch for and prevent abuse of the Hmong.252 
There have been no prosecutions of genocide in the IC], although the 
IC] has attempted to set up a tribunal to prosecute war crimes in the 
former lligoslavia.253 The Hmong could, however, attempt to have their 
claims on genocide heard in the United States.254 In Kadic v. Karadzic, 
a United States Circuit Court decided that aliens can sue under the 
Alien Tort Act, 28 U .S.C. § 1350 (1988), for crimes in violation of the 
law of nations, against the parties responsible.255 There is jurisdiction 
if the party is served on United States soil, and it includes the crime 
of genocide.256 
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IV. OTHER SOLUTIONS FOR THE HMONG AND CONCLUSION 
The Hmong, despite the shortcomings of their legal claims, should 
still attempt to gain for themselves a measure of safety. They have no 
leverage to exploit. The Hmong have no power now, either in Thailand 
or in Laos, and no alliance with the United States. The international 
community has overlooked past abuses of these people in order to 
attempt to find a durable solution for the Hmong.257 The Hmong are 
the only group that has not been consulted in any solution process. 258 
The Hmong need to build a power base in the international 
community. This may be a challenge at present with the eyes of the 
world focused on the difficulties in the former Yugoslavia. However, 
pressing their claims against the various bodies may give them a greater 
standing internationally. Even though the legal arguments may be 
weak or precluded by various procedural rules, the process of bringing 
the claims may, in fact, lead to more attention internationally. The 
Hmong cause has hitherto been obscure. The Hmong in the United 
States should continue to try to bring attention to their kinsmen in 
Thailand. If possible, the Hmong should try to wage a media campaign 
against the funding of the repatriation process in Thailand.259 
The Hmong in the United States could also continue to petition 
Congress to aid the Hmong refugees. Laos wishes to become a more 
significant player in the international market. 260 The United States 
could use this as leverage to assure that the Hmong are not persecuted. 
One writer has suggested several possibilities to increase Congressional 
pressure on Laos.261 He suggests that the Congress could press the UN 
or the Thai Government to carry out a further review of the cases of 
those that insist that they have been unfairly denied refugee status.262 
Congress can also ensure that those that qualifY for resettlement status 
in the United States be given that option, and Congress can pressure 
the Laotian Government to open its borders and allow investigations 
of abuse upon return.263 Whether or not the claims are substantiated, 
the United States can bring economic pressure. This solution has 
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begun to succeed at various times, as at one time or another, a Con-
gressman has taken up their cause.264 However, these efforts on the part 
of a few Congressmen should not be thwarted, either by apathy or the 
lobbying of business interests. 
The Hmong can also turn to more drastic measures. They have 
been carrying out a low-level resistance against the LPDR since it took 
over in 1975. Yang Pao has been receiving contributions to continue 
a resistance in Laos since he left in 1975.265 Perhaps, if the Hmong 
stepped up their attacks at this crucial juncture, they would receive 
more international attention. However, this effort could backfire, since 
it could seem to the international community that the Hmong are the 
only hindrance to a working solution to the refugee problem in South-
east Asia, and this would turn sentiment against them. The Hmong 
most certainly do not want to turn the world opinion against their 
cause, since this would only have the possible effect of speeding up 
their repatriation. 
The United States must also accept its moral responsibility. Over 
the last two decades, Thailand has accepted the refugee problem 
within its borders. The United States has taken a first step in this 
direction, since the House has passed a bill making Hmong refugees 
a priority.266 Also, the Hmong must be willing to accept a final solution 
to their crisis, since they cannot remain in the refugee camps forever. 
The Hmong are refugees from a country which has called for the 
complete destruction of their people. However, many of these abuses 
occurred quite some time ago, and all countries involved at the time 
seem to want to resolve old problems. The repatriation of the Hmong 
has taken on a momentum of its own, and it is difficult to stop the 
progress. The Hmong, through various legal and non-legal methods, 
could attempt to provide for themselves a measure of security by 
attracting the attention of the international community. If more people 
were aware of their plight, the Hmong would be much less likely to be 
abused upon any return to Laos. The Hmong, however, face many 
difficult challenges, and they once again may be called upon to face 
the hard road. 
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